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A TIMELY PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE THE
STUDENT LOAN INTEREST DEDUCTION
Victoria J. Haneman*
INTRODUCTION
Deductions for interest paid on indebtedness have a long and venerable
history in United States tax law. The interest deduction was included in both
the Civil War Income Tax Act1 and the 1894 Income Tax Act,2 and was one of
the original itemized deductions allowed in the 1913 Revenue Act.3 Sweeping
changes were made to the tax code under President Ronald Reagan based, in
part, upon the belief that the complex web of deductions, credits, and exclu-
sions encouraged personal consumption over savings and investment.4 One
such change under Section 511(b) of the Taxpayer Reform Act of 1986 (TRA
1986) was the elimination of the deduction for interest on personal indebted-
ness5—and because education is generally treated as a personal consumption
expense,6 this disallowance encompassed interest paid on student loan debt.7
The demise of the interest deduction sparked a decade-long battle in Con-
gress for its revival. Less than three months after the enactment of TRA 1986,
Senator John Kerry objected to the denial of the tax deduction for interest on
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Dauer, University of Denver College of Law, for taking an interest in my scholarship and
offering invaluable advice, encouragement, and guidance. Also, my heartfelt gratitude to
Daniel Pasek, Ivy Hensel, and Matthew Beckstead for taming my unruly footnotes.
1 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 479.
2 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
3 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
4 David E. Rosenbaum, The Push and Pull Over Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1992, at D1,
D15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/08/business/the-push-and-pull-over
-taxes.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Due to the extent of the changes, the Tax Code of
1954 was renamed the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Kelly Phillips Erb, Deduct This: The
History of Student Loan Interest, FORBES (June 13, 2011, 9:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/kellyphillipserb/2011/06/13/deduct-this-the-history-of-the-student-loan-interest.
5 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2246 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.); see also Julee Brooke Little, Note, Section 163:
Interest Paid on Educational Indebtedness—Past, Present and Future, 43 TAX LAW. 1007,
1007–08 (1990).
6 Most student loan interest cannot be qualified as a trade or business expense. See Loretta
Collins Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenditures: An Unfair Investment
Disincentive, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 621, 630–31 (1990); Hamish P.M. Hume, Note, The
Business of Learning: When and How the Cost of Education Should Be Recognized, 81 VA.
L. REV. 887, 890–91 (1995).
7 For tax purposes, educational expenses are viewed as “constitut[ing] an inseparable aggre-
gate of personal and capital expenditures . . . .” 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-5(b) (2013).
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student loans as “unfair and unwise”8 and stressed that it is “urgent that we
immediately address this problem during 1987. . . .”9 A bill renewing some
form of a deduction for student loan interest was introduced in every Congress
thereafter, until Section 20210 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA 1997)
added § 221 to the Internal Revenue Code, allowing the deduction of interest
paid on qualified student loans.11 Objective analysis suggests that § 221 is a
paradigm of inefficiency that is unlikely to increase access to education or
markedly assist with debt service after graduation, and therefore, the dedicated
effort by Congress to revive the deduction offers a troubling illustration of the
way in which public perception may adversely affect the tax legislative process.
Recent developments in higher education create a pressing need to move
past the proffered justifications to examine the utility of § 221. Over the past
three decades, “annual costs at four-year colleges have risen three times as fast
as inflation . . . .”12 Federal assistance to college and graduate students has
largely shifted from grants to loans over the past two decades.13 American stu-
8 133 CONG. REC. 331 (1987) (statement of Sen. John Kerry). An important objection to the
repeal was that students had borrowed with the expectation of a deduction and loans already
closed would not receive “grandfathered” treatment, but instead, were afforded only minimal
transition relief providing for a deduction that gradually phased out between 1987 through
1990. J. Timothy Philipps & Timothy G. Hatfield, Uncle Sam Gets the Goldmine—Students
Get the Shaft: Federal Tax Treatment of Student Loan Indebtedness, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 249, 287, 293–94 (1991).
9 When we consider the growing cost of housing, and of other expenses associated with getting
started in life, it becomes very clear why some educators have asked what the long-term effect of
student borrowing will be on career choices, and even more fundamental decisions about mar-
riage, family size and so on.
133 CONG. REC. 331 (1987). Senator Kerry may have been correct in his concern that stu-
dent loan debt would have serious impacts on decisions such as marriage. See, e.g., Lynnette
Khalfani-Cox, Student Loan Horror Stories: What’s the Worst That Can Happen?,
DAILYFINANCE (Aug. 20, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/08/20/stu
dent-loan-horror-stories-whats-the-worst-than-can-happen/
One woman . . . says student loans have helped her achieve various academic and professional
goals. Those same loans, however, helped ruin a cherished relationship, too.
The [thirty-three]-year-old woman last month endured a painful breakup with her boyfriend
of seven years. “Much of it was to do [sic] to the fact that I have over $150,000 in student loan
debt and he did not want to be responsible, or help me, pay it back . . . . He wanted other things,
such as a house and kids, and that is simply not an option for me as I have this mountain of debt
to pay back.”
Id.
10 See, e.g., H.R. 488, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 394, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 82, 103d
Cong. (1993).
11 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 202, 111 Stat. 788, 806 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 221 (2012)). The Act was “a significant expansion in the use of tax
policy to encourage enrollment and to help families and communities pay for schools.” BOB
LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION IN THE TAXPAYER RELIEF
ACT OF 1997: NEW LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2000), available at http://digital.library
.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs1245/.
12 James Surowiecki, Debt by Degrees, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.new
yorker.com/talk/financial/2011/11/21/111121ta_talk_surowiecki.
13 The Pell Grant program has never before covered such a small portion of college costs. In
1980, the maximum grant amount covered 77 percent of the cost of a four-year degree at a
public university, as compared to 36 percent today. Tyler Kingkade, Pell Grants Cover
Smallest Portion of College Costs in History as GOP Calls for Cuts, HUFFINGTON POST
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dents increasingly use loans to pay for the cost of higher education, and student
loan debt recently surpassed $1 trillion while continuing to climb.14 This type
of indebtedness is increasingly difficult to shoulder with present unemployment
and underemployment rates, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
recently revealed that “as many as 27 [percent] of all student loan borrowers
are more than [thirty] days past due.”15 With the rising cost of education, the
younger generation may be indiscriminately borrowing more money than their
education will ultimately be worth.16 There is legitimate concern that the coun-
try will soon be facing some version of a student loan debt bubble, with poten-
tially devastating consequences for a struggling economy that has recently
weathered (in relatively short succession) rupture of the dot-com bubble and
the mortgage debt bubble.17
Providing students with access to higher education has been a priority of
the federal government for more than half a century.18 Access to higher educa-
tion for all citizens is viewed as a pillar of our egalitarian society, and the
(Aug. 29, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/27/pell-grants-college
-costs_n_1835081.html; see also THE NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY & HIGHER EDUC., LOS-
ING GROUND: A NATIONAL STATUS REPORT ON THE AFFORDABILITY OF AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION 7 (2002), available at http://www.highereducation.org/reports/losing_ground
/affordability_report_final_bw.pdf.
14 Tyler Durden, The Next Shoe Drops: More Than 25% of Student Loans Are Already
Delinquent. . ., BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 25, 2012 3:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the
-next-shoe-drops-more-than-25-of-student-loans-are-already-delinquent-2012-3 (“[J]ust sur-
passed $1 trillion, and is growing at $40–50 billion each month.”); see also Surowiecki,
supra note 12 (“Some of the boom in student debt can be chalked up to demographics: in the
past decade, the number of college-age Americans rose by more than three million and the
proportion of eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds enrolled in college went from [35] percent
to [41] percent.”).
15 Durden, supra note 14 (suggesting that the delinquency rates are a symptom of underem-
ployment and unemployment, with 46 percent of eighteen to twenty-four year olds in the
United States unemployed, which rivals unemployment statistics for young adults in Euro-
pean countries in the midst of financial crisis, such as Greece at 46 percent and Spain at 51
percent); accord Rick Newman, How Student Debt is Slowing the Recovery, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2012/04
/09/how-student-debt-is-slowing-the-recovery (“With a shortage of income to make loan
payments, the default rate on federally guaranteed student loans has nearly doubled, from 4.6
percent for loans originated in 2005 to 8.8 percent for loans granted in 2009.”).
16 Surowiecki, supra note 12; see also Blake Ellis, Average Student Loan Debt Nears
$27,000, CNN MONEY (Oct. 18, 2012, 8:14 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/18/pf/col
lege/student-loan-debt/ (“Two-thirds of the class of 2011 held student loans . . . and the
average borrower owed $26,600, according to a report from the Institute for College Access
& Success’ Project on Student Debt. That’s up 5 [percent] from 2010 and is the highest level
of debt . . . the report has . . . published.”).
17 Surowiecki, supra note 12.
18 See Sima J. Gandhi, Understanding Students from a Behavioral Economics Perspective:
How Accelerating Student Loan Subsidies Generates More Bang for the Buck, 17 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 130, 130 (2008).
Federal funding for higher education has played a substantial role in providing students with
access to higher education from the 1944 direct subsidies of the GI Bill, to the 1965 subsidized
student loans of the Higher Education Act (HEA), to the more recent tax credits and deductions
of the 2001 tax bill.
Id.
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public widely supports federal assistance in this area.19 Although investment in
education theoretically produces an income stream sufficient to cover the cost
of the investment, the private market will generally not lend against these
future earnings and educational expenses because they arise before the individ-
ual has earned the income necessary to pay for them.20 As one means of pro-
viding students with access to higher education, the government has stepped
forward to bridge a gap by facilitating loans to fund higher education.21
Another way in which the government attempts to assist with the cost of
higher education is through a complex web of tax expenditures that includes
§ 221.22 Although § 221 is unlikely to increase access to education or markedly
assist with debt service after graduation, the decade-long battle waged by Con-
gress to revive the deduction highlights the fact that public perceptions of a tax
provision have an unquantifiable but tacit impact.23 The complexity of the tax
code causes many taxpayers to rely upon sound bites provided by politicians
with a motive to undersell or oversell the impact of tax legislation, and as a
result, the voting public may not necessarily perceive a tax provision as ineffi-
19 This Article will not explore whether supply exceeds demand—and specifically, whether
some students are more likely to succeed in a vocational program rather than a university
degree program. See, e.g., Mark Phillips, Why We Need Vocational Education, WASH. POST
(June 5, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/why-we
-need-vocational-education/2012/06/04/gJQA8jHbEV_blog.html.
[I]n Finland’s highly successful educational system, 45 [percent] of the students choose a techni-
cal track, not an academic track, after completing their basic education.
. . . .
. . . Many of the skills most needed to compete in the global market of the 21st century are
technical skills that fall into the technical/vocational area. The absence of excellence in many
technical and vocational fields is also costing us economically as a nation.
Id. See also Kenneth Gray et al., Is Vocational Education Still Necessary? Investigating the
Educational Effectiveness of the College Prep Curriculum, 32 J. INDUS. TCHR. EDUC. 6, 6–7
(1995), available at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JITE/v32n2/gray.html (“Between
1982 and 1990, the percentage of all high school students who reported being on the college
track increased from 10 [percent] to 64 [percent]. . . . Meanwhile, by 1990, less than 10
[percent] of all high school students identified themselves as being enrolled in vocational
education.”).
20 See generally Stephen P. Zeldes, Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical
Investigation, 97 J. POL. ECON. 305 (1989) (discussing the problems that arise from the
inability to borrow against future income). Conversely, “the Chicago School’s economists
put forth the Human Capital Hypothesis (HCH) . . . [positing] that the costs of higher educa-
tion should not be subsidized because the high returns to education more than compensate
for the initial costs.” Thus, all education subsidies “essentially pay a student to make [more]
money.” Gandhi, supra note 18, at 135.
21 See Scott Cohn, Lots of Money for Student Loans—But at What Cost?, CNBC (Dec. 20,
2010, 11:21 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/40681252 (“Beginning this year [2010], the gov-
ernment began lending directly to students, rather than subsidizing and guaranteeing loans
from private lenders.”).
22 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25A (2012); I.R.C. § 221 (2012); I.R.C. § 222 (2012); I.R.C. § 529
(2012).
23 Placebo effects in the law have been discussed by several other scholars. See, e.g., Amitai
Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 54 (2006) [hereinafter Aviram, Placebo Effect]; Amitai Aviram, In Defense
of Imperfect Compliance Programs, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763 (2005).
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cient.24 It is concerning, however, if congressional attachment to a student loan
interest deduction is fueled less by its objective result and more by the norma-
tive message communicated: that student loan debt, like home mortgage debt,
is favored personal debt.
While § 221 is intended to provide relief with the burden of debt service
on student loans, it also underscores cultural and national norms through
implicit characterization of student loan debt as preferred. Every tax deduction
that encourages a behavior or expenditure is an act of social engineering with
hidden costs.25 Against the backdrop of steeply rising education costs,
increased student borrowing, and current unemployment and underemployment
rates, it is time to address the inappropriate political gamesmanship of capitaliz-
ing a cultural expectation in a deduction that provides no meaningful assistance
to student borrowers. The Article begins in Section I with a discussion of the
student loan debt bubble, if it indeed exists, and the way in which it may be
exacerbated when conspicuous consumption collides with rising unemploy-
ment. Section II provides a brief history and overview of the tax treatment of
student loan interest in the United States. Section III examines the procedural
use of a tax expenditure such as § 221 to provide incentives for higher educa-
tion and assist student borrowers, and Section IV discusses the failure of the
expenditure to accomplish its objective goals. In light of its objective failure,
Section V cautions that the student loan interest deduction is nothing more than
a hollow gesture and proposes a realistic approach to replace the deduction.
I. THINKING OUTSIDE OF THE BUBBLE: THE SLOWLY DEFLATING
STUDENT LOAN DEBT TIRE26
The United States Department of Education was established in 1867.27 Al-
though its initial focus was information gathering to help establish an effective
24 [J]ust as currency traders cause exchange rates to converge by identifying divergences in
rates and transacting in a manner that diminishes the exchange rate divergence and generates
profits for the traders, politicians profit from identifying misperceived risks and transacting
(enacting laws) in a way that causes perceived risks to converge with actual risks. Aviram,
Placebo Effect, supra note 23, at 78.
25 Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151, 1162
(2006).
[I]t is always the case that changes in tax policy have the intended or unintended effect of
changing society, that is, of being at least inadvertent acts of social engineering. Every definition
of income, every exclusion, every attempt to simplify the tax system, involves choices as to what
should be encouraged and what discouraged.
Id.
26 Cf. The Student Loan Debt Bubble (Think Virus-Spreading Monkey from the Movie
Outbreak!), I’M DATING A ONE PERCENTER (May 7, 2012), http://imdatingaonepercenter
.wordpress.com/2012/05/07/the-student-loan-debt-bubble-think-virus-spreading-monkey
-from-the-movie-outbreak/ (“[T]he student debt crisis needs to be treated like the virus-
spreading monkey from Outbreak. It needs to be tracked down, quarantined, studied, and
injected with every single freaking viable solution out there — and then apply the solution in
a mass sweep.”).
27 History of Student Financial Aid, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/educators/history.phtml
(last visited Nov. 25, 2013). Harvard University established the first loan program in the
United States in 1840, which is more than a quarter of a century before the establishment of
the Department of Education. Id.
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school system, this changed when there was a shift in cultural norms in the
1950s.28 A college education gradually became viewed as more of a necessity
than a luxury. Consequently, the Department of Education now has the third
largest discretionary budget of the Departments, behind the Department of
Defense and the Department of Health and Human Services.29
Established in 1958 through the National Defense Education Act, the Per-
kins Loan Program was the first federally funded loan program.30 The Higher
Education Act of 1965 replaced the Perkins Loan Program with the Guaranteed
Student Loan Program (currently known as the Stafford Loan Program), which
was originally designed to open the door of higher education to the lowest-
income students.31 In 1978, Congress and the Carter Administration enacted
the Middle-Income Student Assistance Act—making loans available to virtu-
ally every student.32 As the cost of a college education gradually increased,
borrowing to pay tuition costs became routine.33 Anticipating that the number
of student loan defaults would increase, the Bankruptcy Code was amended in
1978 to limit the number of student loan discharges.34
Not surprisingly, federal loan expenditures increased dramatically when
loans were made broadly available.35 And despite an ever-increasing amount of
student loan debt, Congress passed legislation in 1992 making it even easier for
students to borrow money.36 Although initially designed to be a program of last
resort to finance higher education,37 the student loan program has gradually
evolved into a program providing money to all students regardless of their
financial need.38 Taking this one step further, the Obama Administration hopes
28 See PATRICIA J. GUMPORT ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COUNTRY REPORT: TRENDS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION FROM MASSIFICATION TO POST- MASSIFICATION 1 (1997), available at
http://www.citizing.org/data/projects/highered/Trends%20in%20HE%20from%20Mass%20
to%20Post-Mass.pdf.
29 Erb, supra note 4.
30 The National Defense Education Act of 1958 was legislation intended to “strengthen the
national defense and to encourage and assist in the expansion and improvement of educa-
tional programs to meet critical national needs; and for other purposes.” National Defense
Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 401-602) (repealed 1962); see also History of Student Financial Aid, supra note 27; Rob-
ert C. Cloud, Offsetting Social Security Benefits to Repay Student Loans: Pay Us Now or
Pay Us Later, 208 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 13 (2006).
31 See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219; Cloud, supra note
30, at 13.
32 See Middle Income Student Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978);
Cloud, supra note 30, at 14. The prior Higher Education Act requirement that only families
with incomes less than $15,000 were eligible was removed under the Middle Income Student
Assistance Act, and student loan benefits were available regardless of household income. See
Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1242.
33 Erb, supra note 4.
34 See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012); Cloud, supra note 30, at 14.
35 Cloud, supra note 30, at 14.
36 Id.
37 Richard Fossey, “The Certainty of Hopelessness”: Are Courts Too Harsh Toward Bank-
rupt Student Loan Debtors?, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 29, 31 (1997).
38 See Lawrence E. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid Policy: A History and an Assessment,
ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OPE/PPI/FinPostSecEd/gladieux.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2013).
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to provide further relief to students facing rising tuition costs by capping loan
payments and forgiving balances after twenty years of payments.39
For almost half a century, the federal student loan program has received
bi-partisan support from Congress because of its political popularity with vot-
ers.40 However, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that student loan defaults cost
the Department of the Treasury billions of dollars annually. The default rates
reached a high of 22.4 percent in 1990 and then steadily dropped to a low of 4.5
percent in 2003.41 There is cause for concern, however, about the fact that the
default rates steadily trended upwards from 2005 to 2010.42 The November
2012 quarterly report released by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
reports that 11 percent of all student loan balances are ninety or more days
delinquent.43 This percentage is far more troubling if one happens to notice the
footnote at the bottom of the November quarterly that clarifies the delinquency
rate is “likely” understated and may be “roughly” twice as high.44
This combination of rising student debt and staggering default rates has
caused many to forecast that a bursting student loan debt bubble looms on the
39 Danielle Kurtzleben, President Lays Out New Student Loan Rules, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/10/26/president-lays
-out-new-student-loan-rules.
Today, the president announced his ‘Pay As You Earn’ proposal, which would allow federal
student loan borrowers to cap their loan payments at 10 percent of discretionary income as early
as next year. The plan would also forgive debt balances after [twenty] years of payments. This is
a substantial change from current law, under which the cap is 15 percent, and loan balances can
be forgiven after [twenty-five] years. The administration estimates that this change would affect
1.6 million students.
Id. At this point, it is impossible to predict the consequences of this plan over the next ten or
twenty years. One can only hope that it does not simply kick the ball further down the road
another ten years, and have the same type of negative consequences that were seen from the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. See Cyrus Sanati, 10 Years Later, Looking at
Repeal of Glass-Steagall, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2009, 3:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes
.com/2009/11/12/10-years-later-looking-at-repeal-of-glass-steagall/ (discussing how the
repeal of depression-era banking laws influenced last fall’s financial crisis).
40 Cloud, supra note 30, at 21.
41
  National Student Loan Two-year Default Rates, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/offices
/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
42
  Id. (2005, 4.6 percent; 2006, 5.2 percent; 2007, 6.7 percent; 2008, 7.0 percent; 2009, 8.8
percent); First Official Three-Year Student Loan Default Rates Published, ED.GOV (Sept. 28,
2012), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/first-official-three-year-student-loan-default
-rates-published (the two-year default rate rose to 9.1 percent for the 2010 cohort; using the
new three-year rate, the Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2008 default rate was 13.8 percent and the FY
2009 rate was 13.4 percent).
43 Kelly Evans, Student-Loan Delinquencies Now Surpasses Credit Cards, CNBC (Nov. 27,
2012, 3:29 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/49983471 (stating a comparable rate of delin-
quency for credit cards of 10.5 percent, auto loans of 4.3 percent, and mortgages of 5.9
percent).
44 Decrease in Overall Debt Balance Continues Despite Rise in Non-Real Estate Debt, FED.
RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/research
/2012/an121127.html.
[T]hese delinquency rates for student loans are likely to understate actual delinquency rates
because almost half of these loans are currently in deferment, in grace periods or in forbearance
and therefore temporarily not in the repayment cycle. This implies that among loans in the repay-
ment cycle delinquency rates are roughly twice as high.
Id.
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horizon.45 Bubbles arise when prices for a particular item rise above the real
value of the item—as is typically seen in a marketplace without price equilib-
rium, wherein pricing does not conform to supply and demand.46 Injecting
liquidity into such a marketplace has the potential to create a vicious inflation-
ary cycle, thereby compounding the problem. Several troubling indicators bear
credence to the belief that just such a circumstance is arising with student loan
debt. First, demand for a college education has increased. College enrollment
has surged one-third in the past decade and tuition has more than doubled dur-
ing that time.47 Second, the volume of student loans is rapidly increasing.48
Student loans are available to almost any student without regard to ability to
repay or creditworthiness. Third, the consumer is unsophisticated. Most stu-
dents utilize student loans without contemplating the burden they will impose
on post-graduation decisions and lifestyle. Fourth, the number of defaults on
student loans is also rapidly increasing.49 Also, the government plays a domi-
nant role in the student loan debt market and accounts for almost 85 percent of
student debt.50
The idea of a student loan debt bubble is not without controversy, how-
ever, and opinions are divided. Some assert either that a student loan debt bub-
ble does not exist, or, in the alternative, that the bursting of this bubble will not
have the catastrophic effect upon the economy that was seen with housing
debt.51 Although the rupture of a debt bubble can often be characterized by a
liquidity crisis wherein borrowers can no longer obtain the money they need,
the government’s dominant position in the student loan market prevented a
liquidity crisis in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis, when fewer private
45 See, e.g., Durden, supra note 14.
46 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 17 (1976). As consumers purchase more, prices
rise. As prices rise, consumers consume less. As consumers consume less or producers pro-
duce more, prices decrease. Id. at 13–14, 17.
47 Fast Facts: Enrollment, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts
/display.asp?id=98 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013) (“Between 2000 and 2010, enrollment
increased 37 percent, from 15.3 million to 21.0 million. . . . Enrollment increases can be
affected both by population growth and by rising rates of enrollment.”); Fast Facts: Tuition
Costs of Colleges and Universities, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov
/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
48 Caroline Ratcliffe & Signe-Mary McKernan, Forever in Your Debt: Who Has Student
Loan Debt, and Who’s Worried?, URBAN INST. (June 2013), http://www.urban.org
/UploadedPDF/412849-Forever-in-Your-Debt-Who-Has-Student-Loan-Debt-and-Whos-Wor
ried.pdf.
49 See National Student Loan Two-year Default Rates, supra note 41.
50 Chris Miles, The Government Holds 85% of Outstanding Student Debt: This Could Be
Another Meltdown in the Making, POLICYMIC (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.policymic.com
/articles/23868/the-government-holds-85-of-outstanding-student-debt-this-could-be-another
-economic-meltdown-in-the-making. At least one registered investment advisor is offering
advice as to how the savvy investor can make a profit when the student loan debt bubble
bursts. Nicholas Pardini, Shorting Student Loans: The Next Major Credit Bubble, SEEKING
ALPHA (July 5, 2011, 9:46 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/277941-shorting-student
-loans-the-next-major-credit-bubble (Sallie Mae (NYSE: SLM), is the leading student loan
company and a government-sponsored enterprise and Pardini recommends shorting for-
profit colleges, such as DeVry, Apollo Group, and ITT Educational Services, which he says,
“have 90 [percent] of their revenues coming from federal student loan aid.”).
51 See Chadwick Matlin, Student Loan Bubble Babble, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2013), http://
blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/03/07/student-loan-bubble-babble/.
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student loans were available.52 Some assert that the use of the term “bubble” is
a misnomer that calls to mind the recent mortgage bubble—ignoring the mate-
rial differences between student loans and mortgages.53 The residential housing
market was worth more than $22 trillion preceding the mortgage crisis, and
total student loan debt amounts to less than 10 percent of all outstanding mort-
gages.54 Wall Street is not heavily invested in bundled student loans as it was
with mortgages, and banks are not exposed to an enormous volume of student
loan-backed securities.55 Moreover, the concept of a debt bubble generally
involves debt used to finance an asset that substantially declines in value
whereas an education does not decline in value. It is further argued that student
loan debt may be distinguished from other types of personal borrowing in that
it has traditionally been accepted that most students will not borrow more in
loans than their education is worth over the course of a lifetime, and even if it is
perceived that they have excessively borrowed, the students will be unable to
walk away from the non-dischargeable loans.56
However, this argument raises some questions about the true value of an
education. The expense of education continues to skyrocket as the government
substitutes one failed ideology (the American dream of homeownership) for a
new ideology (every child deserves a college education).57 Blame does not rest
solely at the feet of the government, as student demand for education also con-
tinues. Higher education, especially top-tier higher education, has become a
conspicuously-consumed good.58 In some instances, academic pedigree has
become a flawed metric by which merit is assessed.59 Degrees from select
institutions serve as a golden ticket to increased social, romantic, and career
52 Private Student Loans, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/privatestudentloans.phtml
(last visited Nov. 25, 2013). William S. Howard argues that the excessive leverage in the
student loan market by the federal government contributes greatly to the problem at hand.
See William S. Howard, The Student Loan Crisis and the Race to Princeton Law School, 7
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 485, 487 (2011) (“When confronted with the increasing cost of educa-
tion, the policy response is to myopically create programs that pour more leverage into an
already over-leveraged system. The result of these actions is no different from the housing
bubble, and their consequences may be just as disastrous.”).
53 Nora Colomer & Karen Sibayan, Bifurcation in Student Lending Shows Lack of Bubble,
ASSET SECURITIZATION REP. (May 23, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 10929555; see also
Jonathan Glowacki & Leighton Hunley, The Student Loan Debt Crisis in Perspective, MIL-
LIMAN (June 20, 2012), http://insight.milliman.com/article.php?cntid=8104.
54 Colomer & Sibayan, supra note 53; Glowacki & Hunley, supra note 53.
55 Colomer & Sibayan, supra note 53.
56 Christopher Matthews, Viewpoint: Stop Calling Student Loans a “Bubble!”, TIME (Mar.
7, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/03/07/viewpoint-stop-calling-student-loans-a-bub
ble/.
57 See Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences,
29 SW. U. L. REV. 501, 504 (2000) (proposing that “[the government student loan] program
has interfered with the educational marketplace by unnecessarily causing tuitions to
increase.”).
58 See, e.g., Daniel B. Smith, The University Has No Clothes, N.Y. MAG. (May 1, 2011),
http://nymag.com/news/features/college-education-2011-5/ (“Still another possibility is that
the primary role of college today is to serve a “signaling” function—like an elegant business
suit, an impressive B.A. advertises talent, pedigree, and ambition employers can use as a
hiring shorthand.”).
59 See Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More
Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117 Q.J.
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opportunities. In turn, a student is more willing to pay absolutely anything for
the prestigious degree that few others have. These students also have less
incentive to change their behavior, and assess the real value of academic rank-
ing as compared against tuition cost, when “everyone” is jumping on the band-
wagon and paying for tuition through financial aid packages.60 There is no
need for a student to be a sophisticated consumer because loans are made read-
ily available without regard to the student’s eventual ability to repay the loan
based upon such factors as earning potential or area of study. Unfortunately,
defaulting on a student loan has adverse effects extending beyond damaged
credit; it may also limit opportunities in professions requiring licensure, such as
the medical and legal professions.61
Perhaps it is most appropriate to refer to the problem as the “higher educa-
tion debt tire”—because, unlike a bubble that abruptly bursts, we seem to be
listening to the hiss of a slowly deflating tire. College graduates are presently
facing $1 trillion in bankruptcy-proof62 student debt and the highest unemploy-
ment rates recorded by the federal government.63 Student loan debt continues
ECON. 1491, 1523 (2002), available at http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/mt/assets/business
/dalekrueger_More_Selective_College.pdf.
Students who attended more selective colleges do not earn more than other students who were
accepted and rejected by comparable schools but attended less selective colleges. . . . These
results are consistent with the conclusion of Hunt’s . . . seminal research: “The C student from
Princeton earns more than the A student from Podunk not mainly because he has the prestige of a
Princeton degree, but merely because he is abler. The golden touch is possessed not by the Ivy
League College, but by its students.”
Id.
60 See THE PROJECT ON STUDENT DEBT, STUDENT DEBT AND THE CLASS OF 2010 1 (2011),
available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/classof2010.pdf (explaining that two-
thirds of 2010 college graduates have student loan debt, with an average of $25,250 a stu-
dent, up 5 percent from the previous year).
61 Khalfani-Cox, supra note 9.
In addition to seriously damaging your credit rating, student loan defaults also carry severe
career consequences. Under the law, professionals with any kind of state license – doctors, law-
yers, accountants and so on – can all have their professional licenses revoked if they default on
federal student loans. Such defaults are particularly troublesome for health-care workers because
borrowers in default also get excluded from the Medicare and Medicaid programs by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. For existing doctors and health-care providers,
they’d be unable to accept Medicare payments, which is critical for hospitals, clinics, physicians
and others. . . . [F]or medical professionals, a federal student loan default ‘effectively eliminates
98 [percent] of your employment opportunities. . . .
. . . .
. . . . [T]hose who default on federal student loans can have 15 [percent] of their Social Security
retirement benefits garnished.
Id.
62 Unlike credit card debt or mortgage debt, student loans are rarely discharged in bank-
ruptcy. See Christine Dugas, Graduates Saddled with Debt, Student Loans Can’t Easily Turn
to Bankruptcy, USA TODAY (May 15, 2009, 1:33 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com
/money/perfi/2009-05-12-studentloans13_N.htm.
63 As Student Debt and Unemployment Hit Record Highs Young Adults Seek Smart Ways to
Build Credit, PRWEB (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/student-credit
/prweb9358385.htm (“Saddled with $1 trillion in student loans and the highest unemploy-
ment rate since the government began keeping track in 1948, today’s college students may
be the unluckiest since the 1930s . . . .”). See also Alexandra Thomas, Loans, Debt and Jobs:
Millenials and the Market, HLN (Mar. 13, 2012, 9:38 AM), http://www.hlntv.com/article
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rising, and the ombudsman for the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau—a
newly created federal agency—has stated that the student loan debt market is
now “too big to fail.”64 As the student loan system grows in size, it is myopic
to believe that rising default rates on student loans will not have a negative
ripple effect on other areas of the economy.65
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TAX TREATMENT OF STUDENT LOAN INTEREST
IN THE UNITED STATES
At the outset, all interest was deductible. The deductibility of personal and
investment interest was provided for when the federal income tax system was
enacted in 1913.66 Student loan interest was deductible without limitation as an
itemized (or “below-the-line”) deduction67 until the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA 1986) amended the Code to deny a deduction for interest on personal
indebtedness, including student loan interest.68 Although the statutory history is
/2012/03/09/millennials-lost-generation (“Only 54 percent of Americans ages [eighteen] to
[twenty-four] are currently employed, according to the Labor Department. That’s the lowest
that figure has ever been since the Department began tracking the data in 1948.”).
64 Bonnie Kavoussi, Student Loan Debt Hits $1 Trillion, Deemed “Too Big To Fail” By
One Federal Agency, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 22, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2012/03/22/student-loan-interest-rate_n_1372506.html. See also Tom Morgan-
thau et al., Those Scary College Costs, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1996, at 52 (“Critics warn that
debt load will rise even more in the next decade . . . .”). In 2011 alone, one commentator
noted that students borrowed $117 billion in federal student loans. Rohit Chopra, Too Big To
Fail: Student Debt Hits a Trillion, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 21, 2012), http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/too-big-to-fail-student-debt-hits-a-trillion/. To put this fig-
ure in perspective, borrowing under the federal loan program was $23.1 billion in 1994.
Kelly J. Todd & Sharon A. DeVaney, Financial Planning for Retirement by Parents of
College Students, 8 FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 25, 26 (1997).
65 See Newman, supra note 15.
The student loan market is smaller than the subprime mortgage market that blew up in 2008, and
student loans are far less complex. But rising defaults could still generate taxpayer losses and
cause collateral damage elsewhere in the economy. “A wave of defaults could have a crippling
effect on the ability of many households to access credit in the future,” writes economist Chris-
tian deRitis of Moody’s Analytics. Millions of Americans, ultimately, could begin their working
lives with wrecked credit.
Id.
66 Erb, supra note 4 (noting that a provision in the income tax imposed in the United States
in 1894 also allowed for the deductibility of interest; however, this tax was struck down as
unconstitutional).
67 See Little, supra note 5, at 1007. An itemized deduction is a deduction taken in calculat-
ing taxable income. Some itemized deductions (referred to as “miscellaneous itemized
deductions”) are deductible only to the extent that the aggregate amount exceeds 2 percent of
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 67 (2012). For tax year 2013, the American
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 reduces the total amount of a taxpayer’s allowable itemized
deductions by 3 percent of the amount by which the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income
exceeds a threshold amount of $250,000 for single filers (or $300,000 for married couples
filing jointly). American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, §101(b)(1), 126
Stat. 2313, 2317 (2013).
68 See Little, supra note 5, at 1007. As a result of TRA 1986, there were two possible
outcomes for the treatment of student loan interest: it either qualified for the business
expense deduction, or, far more likely, it was treated as personal and nondeductible. This
article limits its discussion specifically to the tax treatment of higher education student loan
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silent, the justification that has been attributed to Congress for eliminating this
deduction is that it discouraged saving for future consumption.69 It has been
argued, however, that a policy that results in education being delayed while one
saves the necessary money is not necessarily prudent or feasible.70
Most student loan interest was treated as nondeductible personal interest
until Section 202 of TRA 1997.71 Section 202 added § 221 to the Internal Rev-
enue Code, allowing for the “above-the-line” deduction72 of interest paid on
qualified student loans.73 The maximum deduction allowed in 1998 was
$1,000; this amount increased to $1,500 in 1999, $2,000 in 2000, and $2,500
for taxable years beginning in 2001.74
Several limitations apply to § 221. This deduction is available to single
taxpayers or married taxpayers filing jointly—but is unavailable to married tax-
payers filing separate returns.75 The deduction is also rendered unavailable if a
student is claimed as a dependent by his or her parents.76 The parent of a
dependent student is only eligible to take the interest deduction if the parent is
an obligor or co-obligor on the underlying student loan.77 Further, as initially
enacted, § 221(d) provided that a deduction was only available for the first five
years in which interest payments were required on the loan.78 This five-year
limitation was temporarily lifted under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
interest that is not deductible as a business expense deduction, which incidentally is the vast
majority of all student loan interest. For a discussion of deductibility of educational expenses
as a business expense, see Stuart Lazar, Schooling Congress: The Current Landscape of the
Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenses and A Framework for Reform, 2010 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1047, 1101–02 (2010).
69 Little, supra note 5, at 1012 (suggesting that interest attributed to education indebtedness
was not distinguished from the personal interest category “merely to simplify the administra-
tion of the tax laws.”).
70 Little, supra note 5, at 1013, 1016 (“Recognizing higher education as a necessity for
individuals and for the nation, proposals to restore the educational interest deduction by
reclassifying it as ‘investment’, rather than personal interest, are in order.”).
71 LYKE, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that TRA 1997 was “a significant expansion in the use
of tax policy to encourage enrollment and to help families and communities pay for
schools.”).
72 An above-the-line deduction, governed by § 62 of the Internal Revenue Code, is deducted
from a taxpayer’s gross income in calculating his “adjusted gross income.” Above-the-line
deductions are generally more favorable for the taxpayer than below-the-line deductions
because the former is not subject to income-based phase-outs and limitations, and is availa-
ble whether or not the taxpayer itemizes her deductions. The Difference Between Above-the-
Line and Below-the-Line Deductions, FISCAL TAX (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.fiscaltax
.com/tax-blog/the-difference-between-abovetheline-and-belowtheline-deductions. See also
I.R.C. § 62 (2012).
73 I.R.C. § 221(b)(1) (2012). A deduction for student loan interest is taken above-the-line—
directly lowering the adjusted gross income of the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(E)(17) (2012).
74 I.R.C. § 221(b)(1). Note that the dollar limitation is not indexed for inflation and is
$2,500 through December 31, 2012.
75 26 C.F.R. § 1.221-1(b)(3) (2013).
76 26 C.F.R. § 1.221-1(b)(2) (2013).
77 IRS, TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION 28 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs
-pdf/p970.pdf.
78 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 202(a), 111 Stat. 788, 806–07.
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Reconciliation Act of 2001,79 and then permanently eliminated under the
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.80
This deduction is taken above-the-line—meaning that the deduction is
available without regard to whether the taxpayer itemizes his deductions, or,
alternatively, takes the standard deduction.81 The maximum annual deduction
was initially phased out for a taxpayer with a modified adjusted gross income82
of $55,000 (or $75,000 for married taxpayers filing a joint return).83 This
income limitation was increased effective January 1, 2013, with the phase out
applying to any taxpayer with modified gross income of $60,000 or more
($125,000 for joint returns), and a complete phase “out for taxpayers with mod-
ified gross income of $75,000 or more ([or] $155,000 . . . for joint returns).”84
III. UTILIZING A TAX EXPENDITURE TO ASSIST STUDENT BORROWERS
When an economist looks at a tax preference—such as a deduction, credit,
or exclusion—she sees an indirect form of government spending referred to as
a “tax expenditure.”85 The critique of tax expenditures is that many such out-
lays are more appropriately made through direct spending programs. Pondering
the merits of any tax expenditure, and specifically the student loan interest
deduction, one must first consider the justification offered for government
intervention in the subject area and then justify the use of a deduction as the
best procedural tack to facilitate the intervention.86 Section III examines both
of these issues.
Justifying government intervention in the area of student loans is not a
difficult task. Higher education is considered both a public and a private good,
with benefits flowing to both the individual and the community.87 Cost has
79 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 412(a)(1), 115 Stat. 38, 63–64.
80 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101(a)(1), 126 Stat. 2313,
2315 (2013).
81 I.R.C. § 222(a) (2012); I.R.C. § 62(a)(18) (2012).
82
“Modified adjusted gross income” is defined in I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(C) (2012).
83 I.R.C. § 221(b) (2012).
84 Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 2.12, available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2013
-05_IRB/ar06.html.
85 This idea was first popularized by Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy (1961-1969). Surrey oversaw the calculation of the first tax expenditure budget
for fiscal year 1968. Upon departing from the Treasury, he joined the faculty of Harvard
Law School. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM vii (1973); see also
Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to
Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352
(1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
303 (1976); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
86 The government seeks to advance higher education through a series of tax incentives, and
this article does not seek to determine if this is a legitimate federal policy.
87 See 2 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Report of the Revisors, June 18th, in THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 414–15 (Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1904) (suggesting that an educated citizenry is
one that is able to guard against degeneracy, resist tyranny, draft wise laws, and administer
those laws honestly—thereby protecting the liberties and ensuring the happiness of the
community).
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always been a barrier to access for students from diverse socioeconomic back-
grounds who wish to pursue an education. Although data supports the idea that
education results in higher financial returns, educational expenses arise before
the individual has earned the higher income necessary to pay for them, and the
private market will generally not lend against future earnings.88 Some form of
federal assistance is necessary to fill the gap, and the public seems widely sup-
portive of government intervention in this area.89 To this end, providing stu-
dents with access to higher education has been a priority of the federal
government for more than half a century.90
Accepting that government intervention is justified,91 the procedural
objection follows that the instrumentality of the intervention should not be a tax
expenditure.92 Tackling the procedural question of whether a deduction for stu-
dent loan interest is the most effective way for the government to intervene is a
herculean task. Until Section 511(b) of TRA 1986 repealed the deduction for
personal interest, which is the way in which most student loan interest is cate-
gorized,93 student loan interest was deductible without limitation.94 This deduc-
tion did not fade quietly from memory after its repeal in TRA 1986. A bill
renewing some form of deduction for student loan interest was introduced
every Congress thereafter,95 until a version of the student loan interest deduc-
88 See Zeldes, supra note 20, at 310 (discussing the problems that arise from the inability to
borrow against future income).
89 This Article will not explore whether supply exceeds demand—and whether it would be
better policy to funnel some students into vocational programs instead of universities.
90 Gandhi, supra note 18, at 130.
Federal funding for higher education has played a substantial role in providing students with
access to higher education from the 1944 direct subsidies of the GI Bill, to the 1965 subsidized
student loans of the Higher Education Act (HEA), to the more recent tax credits and deductions
of the 2001 tax bill.
Id.
91 Although government intervention is justified in this area, it may be time to examine
whether the intervention to-date has been effective. See, e.g., Aisha Labi, OECD Report
Links Higher-Education Access with Student Support, Despite Tuition, CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 11, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/OECD-Report-Links/134300/
(stating that the United States only ranks 14th in the world for overall higher-education
attainment levels, and countries such as Finland, Israel, and Russia may soon surpass Ameri-
can attainment levels).
92 Although tax scholars frequently object that social policy objectives should be funded
directly, some economists see tax policy as an effective method of addressing societal con-
cerns. See, e.g., Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics
and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685 (2002).
93 Most student loan interest cannot be qualified as a trade or business expense. See Argrett,
supra note 6, at 630–31, 658; Hume, supra note 6, at 891–93; Lazar, supra note 68, at
1101–02.
94 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2246 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 163(g) (1988)).
95 See 143 CONG. REC. S8,415, S8.456 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Grassley) (“For education, this tax-relief bill renews the deductibility of interest incurred on
student loans. I have introduced that particular bill in every Congress since it was repealed in
1986.”). Immediately on the heels of the enactment of TRA 1986, on January 6, 1987, Sena-
tor Kerry objected to the retroactive elimination of the tax deduction for interest on student
loans as “unfair and unwise” and stressed:
[I]t is urgent that we immediately address this problem during 1987 . . . .
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tion was reincarnated as an above-the-line deduction in Section 202 of TRA
1997.96
The revival of the student loan interest deduction slightly more than a
decade after its elimination is mildly confusing in light of the heroic and persis-
tent efforts to eradicate the tax expenditures that riddle the Code.  More puz-
zling, however, is that the procedural choice made was once again a
deduction.97 While tax expenditures come in the form of exemptions, credits,
and deductions, the latter are particularly inequitable in their conferral of a
higher subsidy or benefit upon the taxpayers in the highest tax brackets—
referred to as the “upside-down effect” of deductions. In an attempt to mitigate
this inequity in § 221, Congress reduced the tax incentive as income levels rise
through the use of a phase out provision.
As a procedural matter, incorporating a phase-out provision into the stu-
dent loan interest deduction illustrates an interesting foundational paradox:
namely, while education is universally regarded as valuable, a tension exists in
U.S. tax policy with regard to assisting students with educational expenses
when those same students are more likely to one day be affluent members of
society.
The design of the deduction and its phase-out provision offers some form
of federal financial assistance to the middle-income taxpayers, who comprise a
significant number of students in college but are nonetheless excluded from
direct assistance programs that primarily target low-income taxpayers.98 As a
practical matter, however, the phase-out provision is far from an elegant solu-
tion and operates as nothing more than a crude sorting mechanism that limits
the deduction based upon income rather than burden. The phase-out therefore
excludes many graduate and professional school students, who carry heavier
debt loads, from taking the deduction.99 The interest cap and phase-out rules
will also exclude those who accept the higher paying jobs they may have to
accept simply to repay their student loans and survive.
It is plausible that a deduction for student loan interest is embraced as a
procedural counterbalance to other perceived inequities in the tax code. For
. . . .
. . . When we consider the growing cost of housing, and of other expenses associated with getting
started in life, it becomes very clear why some educators have asked what the long-term effect of
student borrowing will be on career choices, and even more fundamental decisions about mar-
riage, family size and so on.
133 CONG. REC. 331 (1987) (statement of Sen. John Kerry).
96 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 202(a), 111 Stat. 788, 806.
97 Although Professor Surrey’s agenda with regard to tax expenditures has largely been
embraced, an irony inheres in the fact that Congress utilizes tax expenditures. “[T]ax prefer-
ences receive bipartisan support—a ‘peculiar alliance’ resulting from conservatives’ attrac-
tion to allegedly reducing the role of government and from liberals’ anxiety to solve social
and economic problems by whatever means.” Cavanaugh, supra note 92, at 714–15.
98 Deborah H. Schenk & Andrew L. Grossman, The Failure of Tax Incentives for Educa-
tion, 61 TAX L. REV. 295, 327–28 (2008) (“One possible justification for the structure of the
tuition deduction and credits is that some forms of federal financial aid for education (Pell
grants) do not target middle- and upper-income taxpayers, although these students make up a
significant percentage of those attending college.”).
99
  See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED TAX AND
SAVINGS INCENTIVES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 42 (J. Comm. Print 1997).
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example, the use of a deduction for student loan interest may provide symmetry
for the borrower and the scholarship student—that is, scholarship students
receive favorable tax treatment under current laws, while borrowing students
must repay student loans with after-tax dollars. Recent media attention focusing
on the desperation of graduate institutions to climb the hierarchy of US News
& World Report rankings calls into question whether graduate scholarships are
allocated in a way that recognizes economic inequality, or whether universities
are simply “buying” students who will bolster rankings.100 In a system where
the borrowing student must repay his loans with after-tax dollars, while the
scholarship student receives a tax-free education, a student loan interest deduc-
tion mitigates the carrying costs of debt for the borrowing student.
Alternatively, the use of a deduction may be appropriate to resolve ineq-
uity created by TRA 1986 in denying deductibility for personal interest (includ-
ing student loan interest) while permitting the deduction of interest accruing on
home equity loans.101 After TRA 1986 and until TRA 1997, financing educa-
tional expenses through a home equity loan gave rise to deductible interest
under Section 163(h)(2) while direct student borrowing did not.102 TRA 1997
lessened but did not eliminate the disparity in treatment in that borrowers who
are disqualified from taking a deduction under § 221 may nonetheless be eligi-
ble to deduct interest attributable to their education expenses if they, or their
parents, are homeowners.103 However, the use of the student loan interest
deduction to correct inequities arising from § 163(h)(2) may demonstrate the
vicious cycle that results when one issue of national importance is accorded
favorable tax treatment and is later used to justify extending favorable tax treat-
ment to other areas of national importance.104
Simpler explanations for the procedural use of a tax deduction may be
more plausible: hesitancy to embrace innovative but untried solutions absent a
crisis;105 fondness for the low-cost, expansive reach provided by the tax
100 See Charlotte Crane, Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 63, 87 (1991).
101 One supporter of the student loan interest deduction asserted that “if we can allow the
deductibility on a second home at the beach, at a minimum we can allow for that investment
in a . . . [student’s] education.” 143 CONG. REC. H2,060, H2,062 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997)
(statement of Rep. Etheridge).
102 Little, supra note 5, at 1010–11.
103 There are many restrictions that limit deductibility under § 221, such as a phase-out and
cap on the overall deduction, that do not similarly apply to § 163(h)(2). See Lazar, supra
note 68, at 1102–03.
104 See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 925 (2007) (suggesting that the enactment of § 162(m) may
have had positive symbolic impact); Note, Legal Analysis and Population Control: The
Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1856, 1874 n.82 (1971) (referencing tax exemptions
proposed to favor small families, as a symbolic commitment by Congress to population
stability); C. Garrison Lepow, The Flimflam Father: Deconstructing Parent-Child Stereo-
types in Federal Tax Subsidies, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 156 (2001) (stating
that a view of § 152 as merely a tax deduction “misses its symbolic character.”).
105 In October 2011, President Obama implemented an income-based repayment plan by
executive order. His plan is detailed further in this article. See infra Part V. See also Educa-
tion Department Launches ‘Pay as You Earn’ Student Loan Repayment Plan, ED.GOV (Dec.
21, 2012), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/education-department-launches-pay-you
-earn-student-loan-repayment-plan.
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code;106 or a motive driven solely by political influences, such as the percep-
tion of the voting public. Navigating public opinion is no easy task, and the
procedural advantage of a tax deduction is its lack of transparency. Section 221,
for example, appears to provide meaningful assistance to student loan borrow-
ers. In terms of dollars deducted for 2009, the benefit of the deduction seems to
be more or less equally spread across three groups: taxpayers earning $0 up to
$40,000 deducted $3,017,476,000 (36.18 percent); taxpayers earning $40,000
up to $75,000 deducted $2,820,386,000 (33.18 percent); and taxpayers earning
$75,000 up to $200,000 deducted $2,501,955,000 (30 percent).107
Understanding the upside-down effect of deductions, however, provides a
very different perspective on these numbers.108 To illustrate, the following
assumptions have been made: a student borrows $22,000 to attend a four-year
institution;109 the amount borrowed consists only of Stafford subsidized
loans;110 because the loan balance is subsidized, no interest accrues until the
student begins repayment;111 interest will accrue at the current interest rate of
106 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incen-
tives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 977 (1986). In a recent Newsweek test of 1,000 U.S. citizens, 73
percent did not know why the U.S. fought the Cold War, 63 percent did not know the
number of Supreme Court justices, 43 percent did not know that the first ten amendments to
the Constitution are the Bill of Rights, 29 percent could not name the Vice President of the
United States, and 23 percent did not know that Martin Luther King fought for civil rights.
Corky Siemaszko, Nation of Know-Nothings: 1,000 U.S. Citizens Take the Citizenship Test
and 38% Fail, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 21, 2011, 1:53 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com
/news/national/nation-know-nothings-1-000-u-s-citizens-citizenship-test-38-fail-article-1.12
2353. Disseminating basic information to the average American household may be far more
herculean of a task than many realize; thus, on issues of national importance, the tax code
allows for dissemination of federal policy at a lower transaction cost than communicating
directly with individual households.
107 SOI Tax Stats – Individual Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, I.R.S.,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats—-Individual-Statistical-Tables-by-Size-of-Adjusted
-Gross-Income (last visited Nov. 25, 2013) (click on “2009” hyperlink for the report pub-
lished as “Individual Complete Report (Publication 1304), Table 1.4,” located under heading
“Individual Income Tax Returns Filed and Sources of Income” and subheading “All Returns:
Sources of Income, Adjustments, and Tax Items”). Data regarding the filing status of the
taxpayers taking the § 221 deduction in 2009 is not available. However, it is fair to assume
that a substantial number of taxpayers in the adjusted gross income category of $75,000 to
$200,000 are filing joint returns, as the deduction was completely phased out in 2009 for any
taxpayer earning more than $75,000 (or $150,000 for joint returns).
108 For a more detailed analysis of the objective effects of the § 221 deduction, see Schenk
& Grossman, supra note 98, at 337–38; see also Lazar, supra note 68, at 1048.
109 A student loan balance of $23,000 is less than the average. Two-thirds of the 2011
graduating class borrowed student loans—and the average loan balance at time of graduation
was $26,600. MATTHEW REED & DEBBIE COCHRANE, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS,
STUDENT DEBT AND THE CLASS OF 2011, at 2 (2012), available at http://projectonstudentdebt
.org/files/pub/classof2011.pdf.
110 Presently, the maximum amount that an independent student may borrow in Stafford
subsidized loans is $23,000 over four years (and effective July 1, 2012, graduate students no
longer qualify for Stafford subsidized loans). The government pays interest accruing on sub-
sidized loans (3.86 percent in 2013–14) while the student is enrolled in school. Alex Bright-
year, Subsidized Stafford Loan, STAFFORDLOAN.COM, http://www.staffordloan.com/stafford
-loan-info/subsidized-student-loan.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
111 Payment is deferred until six months after the student graduates. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
FEDERAL STUDENT AID HANDBOOK 2002–2003: CH. 3 - GRACE PERIODS, DEFERMENT, &
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3.4 percent;112 and the loan term is ten years. The cumulative loan payment is
$25,982.38, which includes principal of $22,000 and interest of $3,982.38. For
the 10 percent taxpayer, the value of the deduction over the ten-year repayment
term is $398.24. The value of the deduction for the 15 percent and 25 percent
taxpayers is $597.36 and $995.60, respectively. The 28 percent, 33 percent, 35
percent, and 39.6 percent taxpayers have too high of an adjusted gross income
to take the deduction. Although each taxpayer has the same loan balance, term,
and interest rate, each with a monthly payment of $216.52, the prorated benefit
conferred by the deduction per loan payment is $3.32 for the 10 percent tax-
payer, $4.98 for the 15 percent taxpayer, and $8.30 for the 25 percent taxpayer.
While it is technically correct, therefore, that § 221 provides some level of
assistance to borrowers, it is a gross overstatement to describe that assistance as
meaningful. The inequity of the procedural use of a deduction also becomes
clear: the least benefit is conferred to those taxpayers with the greatest need.
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE STUDENT LOAN INTEREST DEDUCTION TO
INCREASE ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION
Tax expenditures may be used as an incentive designed to change taxpayer
behavior or hardship relief intended to help reduce the impact of a taxpayer’s
misfortune.113 The Senate Finance Committee Report accompanying Section
202 of TRA 1997 states that the student loan interest deduction in § 221 is
intended to serve both as an incentive provision to encourage and support
advanced education and also a hardship provision to assist with the burden of
debt after graduation.114 The estimated tax expenditure attributable to § 221
was $400 million in both 2012 and 2013.115 These numbers do not compare in
size to some of the largest tax expenditures, including $131.7 billion on
employer-provided health insurance and $69.7 billion on the mortgage interest
deduction.116 Nevertheless, an expenditure of more than $300 million per year
is problematic if it does not accomplish intended goals. This Section considers
FORBEARANCE IN DETAIL (2002), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/sfahandbooks/attach
ments/0203SLGCh3Forbear.pdf.
112 The interest rate for Stafford subsidized loans in 2013–14 is 3.86 percent. Stafford Loan
Interest Rates, STAFFORDLOAN.COM, http://www.staffordloan.com/stafford-loan-info/inter
est-rates.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
113 Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Develop-
ments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225, 228 (1979).
114 S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 20 (1997) (“[M]any students incur considerable debt in the course
of obtaining undergraduate and graduate education. The Committee believes that permitting
a deduction for interest on certain student loans will help to ease the financial burden that
such obligations represent.”).
115 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDI-
TURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007–2011, at 20 (J. Comm. Print 2007) (“A tax expenditure is
measured by the difference between tax liability under present law and the tax liability that
would result from a recomputation of tax without benefit of the tax expenditure provision.”).
See also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009–2013, at 38 (J. Comm. Print 2010).
116 Both numbers are for 2013. Joint Committee on Taxation Releases Latest Estimates of
Tax Expenditures, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Feb. 1, 2013), http://crfb.org
/blogs/joint-committee-taxation-releases-latest-estimates-tax-expenditures.
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the myriad of ways in which the student loan interest deduction fails to achieve
its underlying objectives.
Facilitating access to higher education is embraced as sound national pol-
icy, and tax expenditures are frequently used with the goal of making education
more affordable and therefore accessible.117 However, § 221 fails to encourage
investment into education primarily because of simple timing considerations.
An interest deduction does not directly influence higher education enrollment
unless the student determines (prior to enrollment) that he is unable to afford
loan payments in the absence of the deduction, and, conversely, that he is able
to afford the loan payments with the deduction. Prior to enrolling in college, a
student cannot possibly know what his salary will be after graduation and he is
therefore unable to calculate the savings that the deduction will provide118—
although, to some degree, the optimism of youth and the phenomenon of social
mobility both play an unquantifiable (though perhaps not insignificant and
likely detrimental as concerns student borrowing) role in a student’s estimation
of future income.119
The provision also fails ex concessis to incentivize the many graduate and
professional students who pursue advanced study specifically to earn an income
greater than $60,000 per year, which is the point at which they start to be
phased out of the deduction.120 Eligibility for the § 221 deduction is presently
tied to modified adjusted gross income, and many students are unable to claim
the deduction due to the relatively low phase-out levels.121 As a result of these
117 Sean M. Stegmaier, Tax Incentives for Higher Education in the Internal Revenue Code:
Education Tax Expenditure Reform and the Inclusion of Refundable Tax Credits, 37 SW. U.
L. REV. 135, 137–38 (2008).
118 See Schenk & Grossman, supra note 98, at 354 (discussing the difficulty for students of
predicting the ultimate relative value of lost present wages when compared to possible
increased future wages after obtaining a college education).
119 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 590–91
(2003).
It is also possible that risk aversion about financial matters increases with age. Richard Posner
has suggested that this might occur because as one ages, more of one’s wealth is held in financial
rather than human capital; older people often do not have the ability to earn wages to cover any
losses they encounter. Hence while people are naturally optimistic, they may become less opti-
mistic with age and experience.
Id.
One explanation frequently offered for the widespread opposition to the estate tax is that people
are unduly optimistic. Although few people are objectively justified in expecting to be subject to
the tax, the argument runs, many unrealistically hope to become wealthy enough to be subject to
it. As noted above, optimism is an important and enduring feature of human psychology.
Id. at 603.
120 For 2013, the deduction phases out when modified adjusted gross income is between
$60,000 to $75,000 for single and head-of-household filers. See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2
I.R.B. 2.08, available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2011-02_IRB/ar16.html.
121 The concept of a phase-out is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code, but, in this
instance, requires that the deduction available under § 221 be reduced based upon the size of
the taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income. As modified adjusted gross income
increases, the amount of the deduction correspondingly diminishes and is eventually elimi-
nated altogether. See Jacqueline T. Albus, Comment, The Deduction for Interest on Student
Loans: Relief is on the Way, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 591, 613 (1998).
While restoring the deduction was definitely a step in the right direction, the new provision does
not advance the intent of those who have been advocating the deduction for the past ten years in
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phase-outs, students with similar loan balances are treated dissimilarly if one
happens to accept a higher paying job. Further, the income phase-out level is
not increased for those students with higher loan balances—meaning there is
no correlation between the phase out and the burden that the loan payment (and
accompanying interest) have upon the taxpayer.
Legislation introduced by Congressman Charles Rangel in 2012 proposed
the elimination of the phase-out in § 221 as a way of making education more
affordable.122 Perhaps bipartisan supporters of this proposal have simply
resigned themselves to the fact that assistance with higher education is inher-
ently regressive in that the education itself will increase a taxpayer’s lifetime
income.123 Indeed, a heavy debt burden inherently forces one to earn a higher
wage.124 However, eliminating the phase-out limitations in § 221 paradoxically
increases the assistance provided through the provision, while also ignoring the
upside-down effect that the phase-out was incorporated to mitigate against.
Elimination of the phase-out disproportionately distributes the benefit of the tax
deduction to those with the highest incomes, without regard to whether or not
they carry the greatest student loan debt burdens. For those higher income earn-
one important respect: the lowered income level phase-out will exclude most graduate students
and those receiving high paying jobs upon graduation from qualifying for the deduction.
Id.
122 Press Release, Representative Charles Rangel, Rangel Introduces Student Loan Interest
Deduction (SLID) Act, (May 11, 2012), available at http://rangel.house.gov/press-release
/rangel-introduces-student-loan-interest-deduction-slid-act#.Ugw66.WYbck.email. Proposals
continue to move the existing interest deduction closer to where it was prior to repeal in
1986. For example, Congressman Charles Rangel introduced the Student Loan Interest
Deduction (SLID) Act of 2012 to increase the tax deduction for student loan interest to
$5,000 (or $10,000 for married taxpayers), also removing the income limitation on taking the
deduction and lifting the five-year limitation. Id. (“Already, the rising costs of tuition and
high unemployment rates for recent graduates have created a student loan debt crisis. Forc-
ing them to pay high taxes on an already overwhelming amount of debt makes education less
affordable than it should be.”).
123 The eight original (bipartisan) co-sponsors of the legislation are listed on the website of
Congressman Charles Rangel: Reps. Jim McDermott (D-WA), Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ),
Shelley Berkley (D-NV), Richard E. Neal (D-MA), John B. Larson (D-CT), Earl
Blumenauer (D-OR), John Lewis (D-GA), and Jim Gerlach (R-PA). Id.
124 Some commenters note the inherent unfairness of the redistributive financial burdens
imposed on college graduates who finish degrees and earn large sums of money:
Fairness, in the sense of a just result, is not an easy concept to define. The problem of reaching
an agreed upon meaning for the term is that people simply cannot agree on its meaning. . . .
. . . .
. . . . Is it fair for a group of persons who have less to take from others who have more? . . .
[S]uppose an individual works her way up from poverty and, after attending medical school and
completing various fellowships, enters practice at age [thirty-three]. She saves a lot of lives,
works long and irregular hours, but also earns a great deal. Society values her contribution
immensely, but the elected government chastises her for not paying her fair share. No such
canard is laid at the feet of her old buddies from the neighborhood. While our doctor was study-
ing and suffering considerable self-denial, they were out partying. The result of their lack of
willpower and determination is that they barely get by now. There is unfairness, not fairness, in a
system that requires our doctor to compensate for her former friends’ shortsightedness.
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical
Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 221, 258–62 (1995).
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ers who could easily pay for higher education without borrowing, the absence
of a phase-out also creates an incentive to borrow.
Finally, while interest deductions by their inherent nature are designed to
reduce the cost of borrowing by reducing the cost of debt service, § 221 does
little to provide hardship relief with the annual debt service of the loans.125 As
a general rule, student borrowers do not see much of a financial benefit from
the deductibility of their student loan interest. For those students who receive
the benefit of the deduction, only $2,500 of the interest paid is deductible each
year. As illustrated in Section IV, whether or not a student will receive a benefit
under § 221 depends on the student’s adjusted gross income after graduation. A
taxpayer subject to the 0 percent, 10 percent and 15 percent brackets receives
little benefit (a maximum possible benefit of $0, $250, and $375, respectively),
the 25 percent taxpayer receives a greater benefit (a maximum possible benefit
of $625), and the taxpayers in the 28 percent, 33 percent, and 35 percent brack-
ets have too high of an adjusted gross income to take the deduction at all.126
V. TOWARDS SOLUTIONS
The use of a deduction to assist student borrowers is procedurally
unsound, and the § 221 deduction fails to accomplish articulated goals, as
explored in Sections III and IV of this article, respectively. The obvious ineffi-
ciencies attendant with the deduction of student loan interest raise a genuine
question as to why Congress immediately fought to revive the deduction after
its 1986 repeal. Objective benefits alone certainly do not warrant or explain the
political battle. It is possible that Congress embraced this deduction because, if
not in actual effect, it at least symbolically promotes higher education, and, if
so, the way in which important national policies are embedded into the tax code
bears consideration. Section V considers the problematic ways in which the
student loan interest deduction hollowly capitalizes on a cultural expectation.
Indeed, higher education policy has reached an inflection point when meaning-
ful action is essential, and implementing meaningful policy changes necessi-
tates a process of streamlining rather than simply layering new law upon old.
Since every deduction in the Code is, to some extent, an act of social
engineering, it is useful to understand the impact of tax expenditures on cultural
expectations and identity.127 The deduction of student loan interest in § 221
125 See DJM, IBR: the Trench, INSIDE THE L. SCH. SCAM (Oct. 8, 2012, 8:10 PM), http://
insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/10/ibr-trench.html (“[A] . . . cut to middle-class
[student borrower] discretionary spending has serious economic impact . . . Almost everyone
agrees that [this decrease will] . . . cause significant economic damage.”).
126 See Schenk & Grossman, supra note 98, at 330–36. In Part I of the Appendix of the
aforementioned article, Schenk and Grossman provide a detailed breakdown of the tax bene-
fit provided by the student loan interest deduction. Id. app. at 366–81. Although the 25
percent taxpayer should reap the greatest tax benefit from this deduction, this taxpayer
repays $34,372.70 of principal and interest borrowed to attend a four-year public college
(assuming a 6.8 percent interest rate), and receives a tax benefit of only $2,370.58. Id. app.
at 369.
127 Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming,
and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV.
863, 913 (2004).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-1\NVJ101.txt unknown Seq: 22 16-JAN-14 8:30
Fall 2013] A TIMELY PROPOSAL 177
conveys an implicit favoritism of one type of indebtedness over another—spe-
cifically, removing student loan indebtedness from the category of consumer
credit and recasting it, along with qualified residence indebtedness, as a type of
debt upon which favored treatment should be bestowed.128 The only other
instance in which a taxpayer can deduct personal debt interest is the home
mortgage interest deduction, and several eerie parallels between these two
deductions should not be ignored.
Both provisions survived elimination in TRA 1986, despite the fact that
neither can be justified on purely economic grounds.129 Politicians have over-
sold the impact of the home mortgage interest deduction, which in turn receives
staggering public support despite the fact that it does not achieve its articulated
goals.130 In much the same way, the complexities of the myriad of educational
incentives in the Code obfuscate the actual benefits conferred through the pro-
visions. The politically popular message underlying both deductions is that the
expenditures are not purely ones of personal consumption, but an investment
that benefits all of society.131 And while § 221 aggressively caps the amount of
the student loan interest deduction in a way that distinguishes it from the home
mortgage interest deduction, interestingly, there has been at least some move-
ment to eliminate this cap and broaden the deduction available for student loan
interest.132
On the heels of the recent economic crisis, however, many are realizing
that the home interest mortgage deduction should no longer be treated as sacro-
sanct.133 The deduction is indefensible from a distributional perspective, as
only those taxpayers with enough income to itemize their deductions receive
any benefit.134 Ironically, these same taxpayers are likely to buy a home with-
out the assistance of a deduction, and thus the deduction merely rationalizes
128 Pamela Stewart, Letter to the Editor, Discouraging Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1991,
at A16, available at www.nytimes.com/1991/02/10/opinion/l-discouraging-students-081091
.html (“To lump education-loan interest in with assorted consumer credit sends the wrong
message about the value of higher learning. If President Bush and Congress care about the
lack of American-born Ph.D. candidates and the competitiveness of our work force, they
should change this aspect of the tax code.”).
129 See William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43, 43 (1996).
130 Doyle McManus, Tax Reform that Hits Home, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, at A13, availa-
ble at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/06/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-mortgage-deduction
-20130206; Gregory Korte, Only 26% Claim Mortgage Deduction: But Those Who Do Say




“Students need to know the Federal Government and the Nation value their contributions
of the mind.” 143 CONG. REC. S3,299 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1997) (statement of Rep. Grassley).
132 As discussed in Part IV, Congressman Charles Rangel introduced the Student Loan
Interest Deduction (SLID) Act of 2012 to increase the tax deduction for student loan interest
to $5,000 (or $10,000 for married taxpayers), also removing the income limitation on taking
the deduction. Rangel Introduces Student Loan Interest Deduction (SLID) Act, supra note
122.
133 See, eg., Schoenblum, supra note 124, at 221.
134 McManus, supra note 130; Korte, supra note 130; Francine J. Lipman et al., More
Alternatives in the Complex World of the Alternative Minimum Tax: The Election to Itemize
Deductions, 18 PRAC. TAX LAW. 7, 8 (2004); Gerald Prante, Most Americans Don’t Itemize
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carrying more debt to buy larger homes.135 Promoting a policy of homeowner-
ship through the use of a mortgage interest deduction played more than an
incidental role in overleveraging.136
If the home mortgage interest deduction is being questioned in the after-
math of the mortgage bubble, so too should the student loan interest deduction
be examined on the eve of a possible student loan debt bubble. Students who
take out student loans are in effect mortgaging their future prospects for current
receipt of education.137 Moody’s Analytics has warned that “[u]nless students
limit their debt burdens, choose fields of study that are in demand, and success-
fully complete their degrees on time, they will find themselves in worse finan-
cial positions and unable to earn the projected income that justified taking out
their loans in the first place.”138 The potential impact of student borrowers on
national economic growth should not be minimized, because discretionary
income dedicated to repayment of substantial student loan balances means dol-
lars not spent or invested in a way that creates new jobs and powers the econ-
omy.139 Further, with more than a trillion dollars in higher education
on Their Tax Returns, TAX FOUND. (July 23, 2007), http://taxfoundation.org/article/most
-americans-dont-itemize-their-tax-returns.
135 McManus, supra note 130; Korte, supra note 130; Teresa Dondlinger Trissell, Turning
the Tide on the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 59 FED. LAW. 16, 17 (2012); Roberta F. Mann,
The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: the Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1359–60 (2000).
136 Gene Steuerle, An Overleveraged Economy: Tax, Not Just Bank, Reform, TAX POL’Y
CENTER (Jan. 20, 2010, 9:22 PM), http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2010/01/20/an-overlever
aged-economy-tax-not-just-bank-reform/.
137 See Joey LeMay, Ph.D, Masters Degree Holders Turn to Food Stamps at Record Num-
bers, MINT PRESS NEWS (May 11, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.mintpressnews.com/ph-d
-masters-degree-holders-turn-to-food-stamps-at-record-numbers/25946/.
A 2011 look at college majors with the highest unemployment rate shows some correlation of
popular degrees and the chances of finding a full-time job. Some of the most common advanced
degrees obtained for both men and women include law, clinical psychology, education, business
administration and management and engineering. However, some of the highest unemployment
rates for degree holders include areas in psychology, legal studies and management.
Also ubiquitous on the list of major [sic] with the highest unemployment are degrees in fine
arts, liberal arts, graphic design and humanities. The Chronicle of Higher Education profiled
[fifty-one]-year-old Elliot Stegall, who followed his passion by continuing graduate work in film
studies, now finds that he is only able to get scarce work as a part-time adjunct professor at small
colleges. With the low wages unable to comfortably pay bills, Stegall and his wife, who have
two kids, receive food stamps, WIC support and Medicaid.
Id.
138 Equal Justice Works, College Tuition Growth Rate Is Biggest Bubble of Them All, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student
-loan-ranger/2011/09/28/college-tuition-growth-rate-is-biggest-bubble-of-them-all (“And, if
the rewards of a higher education continue to fall and required educational debt burdens
continue to rise, Moody’s foresees a future in which fewer people may invest in a college
education. In the long term, a less educated and therefore less productive workforce would
put the United States at a competitive disadvantage.”).
139
  See DJM, supra note 125 (commenting on the effect that Obama’s Income Based
Repayment Plan will have on reducing the discretionary income of student loan borrowers,
thereby impacting the overall economy).
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indebtedness and troubling default rates, any program that encourages enroll-
ment at the expense of responsible borrowing is not sustainable.140
Favoring student loan debt through a student loan deduction, in combina-
tion with unqualified access to borrowed funds, is nothing more than the con-
gressional recycling of policies applied in the context of home mortgage
borrowing. Unlike mortgage debt however, all student loan debt (including debt
borrowed from private, for-profit lenders)141 falls within a very narrow cate-
gory of debt that is nondischargeable in bankruptcy—including tax debts, child
support obligations, and also debts obtained by fraud, willful and malicious
injury to another, and criminal restitution.142 The nondischargeability of stu-
dent loan debt is a departure from bankruptcy dogma that society benefits as a
whole by providing a “fresh start” from inexorable insolvency.143 As a matter
of national policy, an interesting tension between tax and bankruptcy statutes
arises from inconsistent cues: borrowing to fund your education is worthwhile
to you and society at large, but, should you struggle under the weight of the
debt burden, you will be a slave to your debt in perpetuity.
Recognizing that measures such as § 221 were simply not enough when
faced with escalating education costs, a commensurate increase in student bor-
rowing, and borrowers struggling under the weight of nondischargeable debt,
the government responded with an income-based repayment plan enacted as
part of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007.144 Under this
140 Herein lies the foundational flaw in a program of loan forgiveness that focuses upon
excusing—not repaying—some portion of higher education indebtedness: an effective stu-
dent loan program should not be structured so as to encourage borrowing without regard to
whether or not the underlying education is likely to produce a return that will enable the
borrower to repay the debt. The Kojo Nnamdi Show: Looming Loans & Scary Stats: A Stu-
dent Loan Debt “Bubble”? (WAMU 88.5 FM American University radio broadcast Apr. 2,
2012, 1:11 PM), transcript available at http://thekojonnamdishow.org/shows/2012-04-02
/looming-loans-scary-stats-student-loan-debt-bubble/transcript.
Perhaps about 10, 12 percent will struggle to repay their loans, either because they majored in a
field of study that doesn’t pay very well or they graduated with too much debt for that particular
income level. A good rule of thumb is to not graduate — that your total debt at graduation
should be less then you’re expected annual starting salary. If your debt is less than your income,
you’ll be able to pay off that debt in [ten] years.
Id.
141 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (codified as amended at 11 § U.S.C. § 523). Although nondis-
chargeability initially applied to only government insured and guaranteed loans, the Bank-
ruptcy Code was amended in 2005 to extend this protection to private, for-profit lenders.
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship
Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 181 (2009) (“In the words of New York
State Attorney General Cuomo, these loans are the ‘Wild West of the student loan industry.’
Thus, with the 2005 overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress stripped away the social
safety net available to the borrowers of such loans.”).
142 Student loans are nondischargeable absent a showing of undue hardship, which is a
standard that is seldom met. Fossey, supra note 37, at 29; Brendan Baker, Comment, Deeper
Debt, Denial of Discharge: the Harsh Treatment of Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy,
Recent Developments, and Proposed Reforms, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1213, 1214 (2012).
143 See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1393, 1426 (1985).
144 College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 493C, 121 Stat. 784, 792
(2007). More than 13 percent of the country presently has two or more outstanding loans.
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income-based repayment plan (“Original IBR”), monthly payments are limited
to the lesser of the following: the borrower’s monthly payment under a standard
ten-year repayment plan; or alternatively, 15 percent of the borrower’s discre-
tionary income. Discretionary income is the difference between the borrower’s
adjusted gross income and 150 percent of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Poverty Guideline (based upon family size).145 After twenty-
five years, the government forgives any outstanding balance.146
In 2010, President Obama urged Congress to enact a proposal that would
cap a borrower’s payments at 10 percent of his discretionary income and for-
give any loan balance remaining after twenty years.147 This modified income-
based repayment plan was enacted as part of the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, which applied to new borrowers on or after July 1,
2014. President Obama implemented the plan (“New IBR”) by executive order
in 2011 so that it instead applies to borrowers who first borrowed in 2008 or
later and took out at least one federal loan on or after October 1, 2012.148
Original IBR remains intact for those borrowers who do not qualify for New
IBR.
The problematic interplay between § 221 and both income-based repay-
ment plans is that the departure point for calculation of the monthly payment
cap is not salary or total income—but, instead, adjusted gross income. This is a
number that can be easily manipulated and meaningfully reduced by those tax-
payers who contribute to pre-tax benefits and take above-the-line deductions. In
turn, the monthly payment cap is lowered under Original and New IBR and the
outstanding balance forgiven by the federal government in twenty or twenty-
Paul O’Donnell, Student Debt Climbs as Credit Risk Gets Steeper, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2013,
4:39 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100420887/Student_Debt_Climbs_as_Credit_Risk_Gets
_Steeper.
145 Income-Based Repayment, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/ibr.phtml (last visited
Nov. 25, 2013). In 2013, the Poverty Guideline is set at $11,490 for a single person in the
forty-eight contiguous states and Washington D.C. . 2013 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfm (last visited Nov.
25, 2013). Therefore, for a single borrower residing in Illinois with an adjusted gross income
of $40,000, $17,235 will be excluded from income for the purposes of calculating discretion-
ary income. Under Original IBR, payments will be capped at 15 percent of his discretionary
income of $22,765.
146 34 C.F.R. § 685.221(f) (2013).
147 Pay as You Earn Repayment Plan for the Direct Loan Program, STUDENTAID.GOV
(Nov. 2012), http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/pay-as-you-earn.pdf.
148 The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 was signed into law on
March 30, 2010. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, § 2213, 124 Stat. 1029, 1081. In October 2011, the Obama Administration announced
that the plan was being implemented sooner by executive action, which is referred to by the
administration as “Pay As You Earn.” Under this new income-based repayment plan, bor-
rowers taking their first loans in 2008 or later and at least one loan in 2012 or later are
eligible. Press Release, The White House, We Can’t Wait: Obama Administration to Lower
Student Loan Payments for Millions of Borrowers (Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/25/we-cant-wait-obama-administration-lower-stu
dent-loan-payments-millions-b; Equal Justice Works, Learn What Obama’s Loan Plan
Means to You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/educa
tion/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2011/11/09/learn-what-obamas-student-loan-plan-means-for-
you.
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five years increases. Therefore, for those taxpayers who are repaying student
loan debt under either income-based repayment plan, the student loan interest
deduction is a boon. In addition to the tax savings afforded by the deduction
itself, this taxpayer also stands to benefit from lower monthly payments and
increased loan forgiveness.
Although it is unavoidable that social and cultural expectations are going
to be capitalized through the tax code, the use of a tax expenditure is wholly
inappropriate when the only thing accomplished is the capitalization of an
expectation.149 Given the potential for another debt bubble, policy that gener-
ally encourages higher education must be thoughtfully refined and narrowed150
to encourage responsible borrowing for higher education and repayment of any
underlying indebtedness.151 Furthermore, a commitment to income-based
repayment requires that the duplication of benefits generated by the tax code be
corrected—because in a system with limited resources, it is inefficient for a
benefit to be duplicated through both direct spending (i.e. the IBR program)
and indirect spending (i.e. the tax code).152
The repeal of § 221 would address a multitude of issues explored in this
Article, but is not in and of itself a practical solution. Eliminating the inefficient
tax expenditures that clutter the Code is a politically unpopular task. A better
solution is to therefore address the problem at its analytical source: namely,
Congress has battled to revive this deduction more for what it represents than
for what it accomplishes. It is politically popular for Congress to utilize tax
expenditures as a way of underscoring its commitment to and support of higher
education, and consequently, a more realistic solution pairs the repeal of § 221
149 With more than $12.7 trillion added to the U.S. national debt over the last decade, there
is no time like the present to focus on efficiency. U.S. National Debt: $12.7 Trillion Added
to the Debt Over the Last Decade, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infographics
/us-national-debt?utm_source=wh.gov&utm_medium=shorturl&utm_campaign=shorturl
(last visited Nov.25, 2013).
150 See, e.g., President William Clinton, State of the Union Address (Feb. 4, 1997), availa-
ble at http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/SOU97/ (“We must make the [thirteenth] and [four-
teenth] years of education—at least two years of college—just as universal in America by
the [Twenty-first] century as a high school education is today, and we must open the doors
of college to Americans.”).
151 The obvious criticism of subsidizing education in a way that encourages enrollment in
socially desirable areas of study is that such an approach is a crude strategy if the goal is to
stimulate the production of outputs. In other words, paying for a college student to earn a
degree in art as a way of subsidizing the arts may be less efficient than directly subsidizing
the outputs—and purchasing works of art. This topic, however, will be explored in greater
depth in a future article.
152 The public is entitled to a reasonable estimate of the amount spent by the government on
its higher education programs. A true measure of aggregate costs when direct spending pro-
grams overlap with indirect spending through tax expenditures requires a change to the fed-
eral budget rules. It is presently inefficient for benefits to be duplicated through direct and
indirect spending programs because, until there is greater transparency and accounting accu-
racy, it is difficult for Congress and the Treasury Department to understand exactly how
much is being spent on efforts related to higher education. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX EXPENDITURES
REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED (2005),
available at http://gao.gov/assets/250/247901.pdf.
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with an alternative provision that works more cohesively with the income-
based repayment plans recently adopted.
The New and Original IBR plans provide for lump sum forgiveness of any
outstanding loan balance after twenty or twenty-five years, respectively.153
This outstanding balance will be included in the taxable income of the borrower
in the year that it is forgiven.154 With the relatively recent implementation of
income-based repayment, many borrowers are unaware of the lump sum (tax)
debt for which they will abruptly be responsible several years in the future.
This will inevitably change, however, as tales of hardship surface.155 The
repeal of § 221 paired with a tax expenditure that excludes cancellation of
indebtedness for those taxpayers below a designated income phase-out is a fea-
sible solution that advances several goals: the taxpayer will be freed from a
large tax bill after satisfying his debt, thereby alleviating a prospective prob-
lem, and the policy embedded in this tax expenditure supports higher education
while also creating an incentive for timely repayment.156
VI. CONCLUSION
If it is true that the collapse of the housing market was largely due to bad
regulation driven by a cocktail of liberal ideology that every American deserves
to own a house and conservative policies asserting that that free markets are
self-regulating, it is important to apply some level of inspection and consider
whether the same brew is again being served in the context of the student loan
debt market.157 Facilitating higher education through the use of an interest
deduction is a recycling of the same ineffective policy that was applied by the
government with home mortgages. After having weathered the rupture of the
dot-com bubble and the mortgage debt bubble, the possibility of a student loan
debt bubble requires meaningful action from Congress. As presently codified in
§ 221, the student loan interest deduction neither encourages students to enroll
153 Kurtzleben, supra note 39.
154 Section 61(a)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code includes into gross income any dis-
charge of indebtedness. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2012). Lenders must report cancelled debts of
$600 or more to the IRS on a 1099-C form. Form 1099-C, Cancellation of Debt, IRS (Dec.
4, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-1099-C,-Cancellation-of-Debt. An exclusion is set
forth in § 108(f)(1) for qualifying public service employees who have worked “for a certain
period of time in certain professions for any of a broad class of employers.” I.R.C.
§ 108(f)(1) (2012).
155 Ron Lieber, For Student Borrowers, Relief Now May Mean a Big Tax Bill Later, N.Y.
TIMES Dec. 15, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/your-money
/for-student-borrowers-a-tax-time-bomb.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
156 The focus of this Article is the way in which § 221 embodies national norms. The pro-
posed solution, pairing repeal of § 221 with an alternative tax expenditure, will be further
detailed in a future article.
157 Cohn, supra note 21.
[Secretary of Education Arne] Duncan rejects the notion that the administration is pushing stu-
dent borrowing in a way that previous administrations pushed home ownership—with disastrous
results. . . .
. . . .
. . . . [D]espite one of the worst job markets on record for college graduates, Duncan does not
believe students should postpone college, or not go to college at all.
Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-1\NVJ101.txt unknown Seq: 28 16-JAN-14 8:30
Fall 2013] A TIMELY PROPOSAL 183
in school nor offers substantial assistance for those who have incurred debt to
finance their education. The proposed solution—pairing the repeal of § 221
with the enactment of a tax expenditure that creates an incentive for timely
repayment of student loan debt—continues to favor student loan debt, but does
so in a way that also complements the recently implemented income-based
repayment plans and underscores the importance of timely loan repayment.
